

Akdeniz University
Institute of Social Sciences

University of Hamburg
School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences

İbrahim USTA

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE PARTY'S EU POLICY

Joint Master's Programme European Studies Master Thesis

Antalya / Hamburg, 2014

Akdeniz University
Institute of Social Sciences

University of Hamburg
School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences

İbrahim USTA

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE PARTY'S EU POLICY

Supervisors

Prof. Dr. Harun GÜMRÜKÇÜ, Akdeniz University
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang VOEGELI, University of Hamburg

Joint Master's Programme European Studies Master Thesis

Antalya / Hamburg, 2014

Akdeniz Üniversitesi
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Müdürlüğüne,

İbrahim USTA'nın bu çalışması jürimiz tarafından Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı Avrupa Çalışmaları Ortak Yüksek Lisans Programı tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Başkan : Prof. Dr. Can Deniz KÖKSAL (İmza)

Üye (Danışmanı) : Prof. Dr. Harun GÜMRÜKÇÜ (İmza)

Üye : Prof. Dr. Wolfgang VOEGELI (İmza)

Tez Başlığı : Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi AB Politikasının Eleştirel Analizi
Critical Analysis of the Republican People Party's EU Policy

Onay : Yukarıdaki imzaların, adı geçen öğretim üyelerine ait olduğunu onaylarım.

Tez Savunma Tarihi : 25/04/2014

Mezuniyet Tarihi : 15/05/2014

Prof. Dr. Zekeriya KARADAVUT
Müdür

İÇİNDEKİLER

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	iii
SUMMARY	iv
ÖZET	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vi
INTRODUCTION	1

CHAPTER 1

AN EVALUATION OF THE EU-TURKISH RELATION

CHAPTER 2

DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EURO-SKEPTICISM

2.1	Contextual Analysis of Euro-skepticism	9
2.2	Determinants of Party Positioning on the EU Accession	10

CHAPTER 3

THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (CHP)

3.1	Historical Development	13
3.2	Evaluating the CHP's Ideological Shift.....	16

CHAPTER 4

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHP'S EU STANCE

4.1	The CHP's EU Policy under Baykal's Leadership.....	20
4.1.1	Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code	21
4.1.2	Minority Rights	22
4.1.2.1	Kurdish Question	22
4.1.2.2	Non-Muslim Minorities	23
4.1.3	Cyprus Dispute	25
4.1.3.1	The Treaty of Guarantee	28
4.1.3.2	The 1960 Constitution	28
4.1.4	Official Accession Documents	30
4.2	The CHP's EU Policy under Kılıçdaroğlu's Leadership	35
4.2.1	2010 Constitutional Referendum.....	36
4.2.2	Ergenekon Lawsuit.....	37

4.3 Under Kılıçdaroğlu's Leadership Exogenous Factors	39
CONCLUSION	41
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	43
CURRICULUM VITAE	48
DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP.....	49

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AKP: Adalet Ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice And Development Party)
- ANAP: Anavatan Partisi (Homeland Party)
- AP: Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
- CEEC: Central And Eastern European Countries
- CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
- DP: Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)
- DSP: Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)
- DYP: Doğru Yol Partisi (True Way Party)
- EC: European Communities
- ECHR: European Court Of Human Rights
- ECSC: European Coal And Steel Community
- EEC: European Economic Community
- EP: European Parliament
- EU: European Union
- GAL: Green, Alternative, Libertarian
- GCA: Greek Cypriot Administration
- GDP: Gross Domestic Product
- HP: Halkçı Parti (Populist Party)
- ICG: International Crisis Group
- NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- ROC: Republic Of Cyprus
- SBPJ: Supreme Board Of Prosecutors And Judges
- SODEP: Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi (Social Democracy Party)
- SHP: Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party)
- TAN: Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist
- TEU: Treaty On European Union
- TESEV: Türkiye Ekonomik Ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkey's Economical And Social Etudes Association)
- TRNC: Turkish Republic Of Northern Cyprus
- UK: United Kingdom

SUMMARY

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE PARTY'S EU POLICY

Under the scope of EU-Turkish relations, the EU stance of the Republican People's Party has been scrutinized under the two party leaders: Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu. After giving basic information on rotation of the EU-Turkish relations, the CHP's historical development and party ideology have been discussed. It is argued that the CHP classifying itself as a European social democratic party today, until recently under Baykal's leadership has maintained its traditionalist, authoritarian and nationalist (TAN) feature and employed a euro-skeptic stance in several cases. However, it is claimed that under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, the party has gained a more green, alternative and libertarian (GAL) identity. With respect to this, first it has been researched that if the party's euro-skeptic stance has changed, and respectively it has been found out that except for some endogenous factors (national cost benefit calculations regarding the EU membership), the party's hard line stance has not been influenced with this shifting of the party ideology.

After arriving to this point, the research continues with the critical analysis of this euro-skeptic stance of the CHP. Under most of endogenous and all of exogenous (EU's extra conditionality regarding Turkey's membership) factors, the critical stance of the party seems to have valid and legitimate ground. At the end, the results show that the EU's pragmatic legitimacy has eroded in the eye of CHP. This is founded to be related with the effects of EU-led reforms increasing governing party AKP's authoritarianism and the EU's extra conditionality treating to Turkey's membership as a 'second class' membership and prolonging the accession period to an open date.

ÖZET

CUMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ AB POLİTİKASININ ELEŞTİREL ANALİZİ

AB-Türkiye ilişkileri kapsamında, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin AB politikası iki genel başkan liderliği altında incelenmiştir: Baykal ve Kılıçdaroğlu. Avrupa bütünleşmesi ve AB-Türkiye ilişkilerinden özetle bahsedildikten sonra, CHP'nin tarihi gelişimi ve parti ideolojisi tartışılmıştır. Bugün kendini Avrupalı bir sosyal demokrat parti olarak tanımlayan CHP, aslında Baykal döneminin sonuna kadar gelenekselci, otoriter ve milliyetçi tutumundan vazgeçmemiştir ve bir çok konuda AB'ye şüpheli yaklaşmıştır. Fakat, Kılıçdaroğlu döneminde partinin daha yeşilci, alternatif ve özgürlükçü bir çizgiye kaydığı öne sürülmüştür. Buna bağlı olarak, partinin ilk önce AB kuşkuculuğunda bir değişiklik olup olmadığı araştırılmış ve bazı endojen (AB konusunda ulusal fayda hesapları) faktörler dışında, partinin politik tutumunun pek de değişmediği kanısına varılmıştır.

Böyle bir sonuca vardıldıktan sonra, araştırma CHP'nin AB şüpheliğinin eleştirel analizi ile devam etmektedir. Bir çok endojen ve tüm egzogen (AB'nin Türkiye'nin üyeliği konusunda ilaveten getirdiği koşullar) faktörlerle alakalı, partinin eleştirel politik tutumunun tutarlı ve hukuki dayanağının olduğu ortaya koyulmuştur. En son varılan noktada, sonuçlar gösteriyor ki partinin gözünde AB pragmatik anlamda meşruluğunu yitirmiştir. Bu ise, AB sponsorluğunda yapılan reformaların iktidar partisi AKP'nin otoritesini artırması, AB'nin koyduğu ekstra koşullarla Türkiye'ye ikinci sınıf üye muamelesi yapması ve müzakerelerin açık bir tarihe ertelenmesiyle yakından alakalıdır.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Dr. Harun Gümrukçü and Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Voegeli who have always been supportive in preparation of my thesis. Their insightful approaches, constructive criticisms and enlightening advises have always guided me throughout this study.

I would like to thank Mr. Tamer İlbuğa and Mr. Johannes Janssen for their significant comments and suggestions.

Lastly I would like to mention my indebtedness to my dear family for their understanding and sensibilities during this research.

İbrahim USTA
Antalya, 2014

INTRODUCTION

Since the 18th century, Turkey under the name of “westernization” has been trying to modernize its institutions. That is why, this westernization process has been used as a synonym with its modernization process (Çulhaoğlu, 2002, p. 171). Within the scope of this westernization project, Turkey has also an ambition to become a member of the European Union (EU). Therefore, Turkey’s attempts to Europeanize its institutions have been studied many times by scholars demonstrating the main constraints and possible outcomes.

However, many times the Europeanization and Westernization/Modernization concepts of Turkey have been misunderstood and misinterpreted. As the European Union keeps enlarging its borders by integrating new member states and expanding its authority over national governments, arguments concerning the nature and future of the EU are understandably becoming more profuse. Also, the widening and deepening of the EU bring about the question of adaptation to European laws, regulations, norms and values. This process of adaptation to European standards by both member states and candidate states is basically defined as ‘Europeanization’ (ibid, p. 172).

After the World War II, the relations between Europe and Turkey in political, social and economic affairs have been more tense and different than any other period. These include many contradictions which have not been overcome yet. However, today given the candidate status, it is possible to make an argument that the relations with the EU have become more consensus oriented than ever. The latest development has been the European Union’s decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004 at the Brussels Summit.

In recent years relations with the EU have become more determinant part of the Turkish political agenda. These of course have created a serious impact on the institutional dynamics of Turkey. Under programs to adopt European standards at institutional base, there have been hot debates between political parties (Bozkurt, 2001, p. 230).

The Republican People’s Party (CHP), as Turkey’s allegedly the most famous social democratic party, has always followed Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s founding principles which are considered as ‘Kemalist’ values. Although Western civilizations’ norms and values cannot be disregarded on the rise of ‘Kemalism’, Kemalists have employed a paradoxical approach towards the West. While they supported a fully adaptation to the Western values and institutionalization, they often opposed Western imperialism which would make Turkey

economically and politically depended to the West. (Ayata & Güneş-Ayata, 2007, p. 214). This would make them both pro-Western and anti-imperialist. The Kemalist nationalism is anti-imperialist because Turkey had to fight against Western powers in the War of Independence to protect country's integrity, independence and national sovereignty (Uslu, 2008, p. 78). Even though, there is a phenomenon that CHP is in favor of Turkey's full accession to the EU, problems appear when it comes to the issues such as sovereignty, supreme central government, Turkey's economic, militarily and cultural goals and ambitions (Bozkurt, 2001, p. 274). Thus, their tendency to stay rigorous about this subject should be well scrutinized. The relations with the EU have always been at the core of political debate in Turkey, and to the consideration of many secularists and republicans, the extent of Europeanization of the country would reflect the results of its ambitions to become a part of the 'West'. In this sense, the CHP from the beginning when İsmet İnönü who as the party leader signed the Association Agreement with the EEC in 1963, had always been in favor of full membership. However, in the last ten year period, CHP's attitude towards negotiation talks and EU's reformist requirements in different policy areas has been more critical than ever. Especially after the 2002 elections, when Justice and Development Party (AKP) with majority formed the government and started to give priority to the accession negotiations, CHP as the party in opposition employed a critical approach towards both the EU and the AKP government. Former leader of CHP, Deniz Baykal with the re-opening of the party in 1992 had a pro-EU attitude and in these years as the Foreign Affairs Minister of Turkey supported realization of the Customs Union with the EU (Ayata&Günes-Ayata, 2007, p. 223). The CHP's euro-skeptic stance however, has started after losing the elections in 2002.

As there have been debates on the problematic issues that have appeared throughout the negotiations with the EU, I take Republican People's Party's (CHP) stance on EU and the present EU-Turkish relations. This would make me consider the approach of the CHP under two party leaders (Baykal and Kılıçdaroğlu) on problematic issues that comprise endogenous and exogenous factors rendering the social democratic party almost hard euro-skeptic in its EU policy. Under endogenous factors, the party's EU stance towards Turkey's internal adaptation of EU norms and realization of EU-led reforms have been scrutinized. With respect to this, the CHP officials have expressed their concerns regarding EU-led reforms which aimed to Europeanize Turkey's constitutional base with respect to rule of law and democratization. On the other hand, the party's reactions to the exogenous factors which cover the EU's extra conditionality and Turkey-skepticism in main European countries have been studied. With regard to this the EU's extra conditionality in the Cyprus dispute, and the

EU's wording in official accession documents have been overtly criticized by the CHP officials. It is claimed that there has been a 'double standard' policy applied by the EU to Turkey's accession process.

Even though the CHP has a pro-Western identity and aims to deepen EU-Turkish relations, during the AKP government period the CHP has shown much more skeptical attitudes towards the EU than ever before. Some have understood this as a sharp turn in the CHP's EU policies, and questioned if it has become an anti-EU party. However, the way accession process has been continuing might really be unfruitful for the prospects of a healthy membership. In this study, I aim to critically evaluate the euro-skeptic attitude of the CHP towards these matters to see if they are justifiable and have concrete ground.

The examination will cover CHP's understanding and explanation of the EU relations and the way they problematize the issues between the country and the EU. This entails to question if they support or oppose the EU formalities and implementations of its prerequisites, and if they are reluctant to the EU membership in some cases. There can be different perspectives among them regarding the EU-Turkish relations, however, most importantly it is noteworthy to ask if their stance is justifiable and their hesitations and reluctances are viable.

In the first chapter, I will briefly make an evaluation of the EU-Turkish relations. In the following chapter, I will give necessary definitions regarding the 'euro-skepticism' concept and determinants of party positioning on the EU accession. In the next chapter, the CHP will be introduced historically with its political development. This will be followed by an evaluation of the party's ideology making it as of today's 'social democratic party' in a subchapter. In the last chapter, I will evaluate the CHP's approach first under Baykal's leadership, then Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership regarding endogenous and exogenous factors that shape CHP's stance on above mentioned problems. I will employ a critical approach to find out if the CHP has a justifiable position to approach to the cases of the EU-sponsored constitutional reforms, minority conception, Cyprus dispute, and official accession documents. In this context, the way the CHP deals with the problematic issues of EU-Turkish relations will be tested with accuracy of their standings.

This work is going to be document analysis oriented. This will make it possible to understand how representatives of CHP have come up with their approaches, and why they have produced such policies with regard to the EU-Turkish relations. In this context, analyzed documents comprise series of official documents, treaties, party publications, announcements, declarations and quotations from representatives.

CHAPTER 1

AN EVALUATION OF THE EU-TURKISH RELATION

For many, acceptance of Turkey's candidature by the EU in 1999 together with opening of the membership negotiations in 2004 has been an important milestone in the way of realizing the 'westernization' project which has been on the table of Turkish politics for more than two hundred years. However, the Europeanization process of Turkey cannot be explained sufficiently with respect to its 'modernization' or 'westernization' since it has many technical requirements that are not only limited to the cultural context. (Samur, 2008, p.2). What is more, it is both a top-down and bottom up process that are closely related with the widening and deepening processes of the EU (ibid, p.1)

The need to establish the European Union has appeared with the end of the World War II. In order such a tragedy be not experienced again, for the first time French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed the idea of establishing a European Community in a speech in 1950 (Bache et al.,2011, p.81) The reason to build up such an organization was to end national conflicts throughout Europe. In the foundation movement, there were people who fought against totalitarianism during the war and were motivated to bring internal peace among former enemies. At the same time, resisting communism during the Cold War years, was only possible by strengthening friendly relations and developing a welfare and prosperity perspective among western Allies (ibid, p.85).

Turkey as member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1951 in global politics took its position behind Western allies against the Soviet Union during Cold War period. This, of course has integrated Turkey with European countries to a certain extent in global politics. What is more, the idea of getting more integrated with the West in other areas, such as economy, has also become more popular during the Cold War years in Turkey. (Koçak, 2002, p. 211). Following the Greece's application, Turkey in 1959 applied to the European Economic Community (EEC) for membership. However, 1960 coup d'état impeded the beginning of the relations. With a four year delay, on September 1963 Turkey and the EU signed the Ankara Agreement with a prospect to make Turkey a full member within community (Çakmak, 2005, p. 95). Ankara Agreement aimed the development of relations in economic sphere between two parties. With respect to this, establishing strong ties between the Community and Turkey and realizing the membership of Turkey by contributing to the development of its economy were counted as important targets of the agreement.

However, in following years the history has shown that for Turkey it was not so easy to comply with the economic and political conditions of the EEC and its weakness in many areas have usually negatively affected its relations with the EEC. Since then Turkey has suffered from many economic and political crises affecting the country's performance both in domestic and foreign affairs (ibid). The military junta of 1960, the Military Memorandum in 1971, military intervention of the Turkish Army in Cyprus in 1974, and coup d'état in 1980 can be counted as its political instability to which the EU has been approaching very critically (ibid. p. 96).

In 1987, Turkey did its application to EEC for full membership. However, EEC did not accept this application on the ground that it was not in a position to accept a new member since it had not completed the economic integration within itself. What is more, it also expressed that Turkey was in need of improvement in economic, political and social areas (Canbolat, 2002, p. 303). The European Commission made a suggestion of establishing the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey when the EU has completed its deepening process and become ready for further enlargement (ibid, p. 304). In 1973, at the end of the preparatory phase, an Additional Protocol was adopted which aimed to remove customs duties between the two sides. Whilst the EU completely removed customs duties on industrial goods of Turkish origin from the very beginning of the transition period, Turkey's removal of customs duties on the EU's industrial goods was to be more gradual. A 22 year transition period was foreseen for Turkey to complete the implementation of the Customs Union (Coşkun, 2001, p. 183). In 1995, after the completion of the transition period, the Customs Union Decision was adopted, during which Turkey eliminated customs duties for EU industrial goods. The Decision took effect on the 1st January 1996 (ibid).

Adoption of the Customs Union under a limited scope which does not include agricultural products, for some has been an important step for the Turkey's EU bid. However, others have criticized the completion of it without becoming a full member. This can be explained on the ground that Turkey has to comply with Customs Union requirements without having a right to express an interest in the formation and continuation of it (Bozkurt, 2001, pp. 329-330). Moreover, the critics have also considered the fact that Turkey has to apply the same tariffs to the third parties with whom the EU is agreed on the tariff levels would make a loss on Turkish economy (Gümrükçü, n.d, p. 132). Therefore, this has generally been a controversial issue discussed still on the political and economic agenda of Turkey.

Following the Customs Union coming into effect in 1996, Turkey's candidature to the EU was denied at Luxembourg European Council on December, 1997. Turkey's candidatureship was only accepted at Helsinki European Council on December 1999, and accordingly for negotiation talks to begin it had to comply with Copenhagen criteria.

"To join the EU, a new Member State must meet three criteria:

- political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
- acceptance of the Community *acquis*: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union"(ibid, pp. 535-536)

The Accession Partnership document, as the main instrument which provides Turkey with guidance in its preparations for accession was published in 2001 for the first time. Following this, it has been revised in the years 2003, 2006 and 2008 (European Union, 2006). Turkey too had to draft a National Program in line with the guideline given in the Accession Partnership document. In National Program to prepare for the conditions explained in Accession Partnership document, Turkey's approaches, strategies and attitudes in domestic and foreign affairs are identified. After receiving the candidate status in 1999, the Coalition Government headed by Bülent Ecevit and also the AKP government after 2002 put much effort so that they can meet Copenhagen political criteria and economic criteria and move forward to align with the *acquis communautaire* (European Union, 2005).

Accession negotiations with Turkey have started officially with the decision taken at the Brussels on 17 December 2004. The Council of Ministers on October 2005 accepted a Negotiating Framework document which sets out the method and guiding principles of the negotiations talks between the parties. Today, we can see in Turkey that many reforms are taking place with an EU-sponsored fashion. This of course has direct and indirect effects on the economic, political and social dynamics of Turkey. Up and downs can be observed in EU-Turkish relations even after opening of the negotiations. For instance, it is also another fact that golden age of relations between the years 2002-2005 have again turned into a blockage followed by EU's negative conditionality regarding some controversial issues which include Turkey's human rights performance, rule of law and level of democracy in the country. The

EU's conditionality prolonging the accession process have caused many Turkish to get euro-skeptic recently. In the next chapter, euro-skepticism and party positioning on the EU accession will be discussed.

CHAPTER 2

DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EURO-SKEPTICISM

There are two dimensions on which the reluctance for the EU membership has been studied: extent and content. In the extent dimension, boundaries of euro-skepticism can be explained through a variety of classifications. It can be either an outright opposition to the European integration as a whole or a contingent and qualified skepticism to pursue national interests against specific EU policy area (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004, p. 4). Another classification of euro-skepticism can be made on its level of hardness and softness. Hard euro-skepticism entails to reject European integration in economic and political terms with an outright and unqualified position. Soft euro-skepticism entails to oppose a specific policy domain which is related to overall integration process or to oppose specific cases with an aim to protect national interest (ibid). Another classification can be made on Europhile and pessimist inclinations to the European integration. These inclinations determine the extent of the euro-skepticism. (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002, p. 8).

The other dimension is 'content' dimension which mainly focuses on the motivations behind public and elite support of the EU policies, decisions and integration process. There are two main categories to define the motivations for reluctance towards the EU. (De Vreese et al., 2008, p. 510; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005). The first category focuses on cost-benefit calculations and makes calculations to detect any benefit or lose from a possible membership and integration process. The second category which is separated from these efficiency calculations as its focus is on the hesitations that come along with the European integration, takes measures of protecting national identity, sovereignty and culture. For example, De Vreese et al.(2008, pp. 512-513) argue that there are mainly two determinants to evaluate the public support for EU membership. First determinant employs the 'hard' predictors that consider the economic and the utilitarian factors, and second, 'soft' predictors that consider national identity and feelings about immigrants (ibid).

The content dimension measures the reluctance towards EU membership either by considering the hesitations coming from calculated costs or anticipated threat to national identity (Ibid). These dimensions and classifications have been successful to explain how and why political actors are reluctant to EU membership, but they fail to explain the change and variations in approaches of the public and elite towards the EU. For instance, if we consider the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in Turkey having a tendency to see the EU as a

Christian club in 1990s, it could have been classified as a hard-Eurosceptic party. However, their descendants, the AKP, still having a conservative identity has become a pro-EU party. Later, up on curtailment of accession negotiations, AKP has turned to hold strong criticism against the EU. In the same way, the CHP has adopted a euro-skeptic attitude recently, even though it was a leading party to promote Western values in Turkey (ibid).

Even though, in their works Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002, p. 30) specified the importance of the need to scrutinize the ‘change’ in euro-skeptic patterns of the political parties, they did not explain the ways of doing it.

2.1 Contextual Analysis of Euro-skepticism

Analyzing the candidate countries’ and particularly Turkey’s euro-skepticism requires a distinctive contextual analysis so that the change in the EU policies of the major political parties can be better identified (Gülmez, 2011, p. 5). Such an analysis, would take into consideration the reactions to the conditionality of the EU by candidate countries. “In this sense, even though there isn’t a long established skepticism against the EU in the public or political elite, a reactive type of skepticism emerges out of concerns due to the complicated negotiation process with the EU”(ibid).

According to the context dimension, reluctance against full membership might appear because of the negotiation process by the EU requires candidate countries to comply with the Copenhagen criteria (ibid). Reactions to the EU conditionality might show up as skepticism in different segments of the candidate country that include the public, media and political elite. For instance, in Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia, with ongoing accession negotiations, the euro-enthusiasm in the political parties turned to euro-skepticism when the EU’s conditionality collided with their national interest. There were huge reactions that turned to euro-skepticism, for example, when the EU asked them to legislate property rights for foreigners (ibid).

Sometimes, candidate countries become reluctant to membership, when the EU imposes additional conditions that originate from bi-lateral issues with another EU member state. Therefore “...the EU inherits the extant problem and fails to act as an impartial problem solver. In order to prevent the member state from vetoing whole enlargement process, the EU puts extra conditions on the candidate countries to solve the problem” (Gülmez, 2011, p. 5). As a result of this, candidate countries may feel ‘strategically entrapped’, and come up with strong reactions to the EU. For example, Economic Zone issue between Croatia and Slovenia

resulted in a temporary curtailment of Croatia's EU membership negotiations because of the Slovenian veto. As a response to this, the public segment of Croatia became more and more euro-skeptic and their support for the EU membership fell from 35% in 2007 to 23% in 2008 (ibid). "Similarly, the EU's Cyprus conditionality on Turkey having curtailed the negotiations for the last couple of years sparked high levels of euro-skepticism in various Turkish political parties" (Gülmez & Buhari-Gülmez, 2008; Gülmez, 2011, p. 5).

Finally, it is also possible that reluctance in a candidate country towards EU membership might appear as a reaction to the emerging opposition in the EU against its membership. In this case, the candidate country does not only have to fulfill the membership criteria, but also has to find a way to relieve the level of opposition developed against its prospective membership within the EU (ibid, p.6). As a reaction to this, the political elite of the candidate country might direct strong criticisms towards the EU, claiming that they should be treated equally by the EU. Therefore, there might be a change in the attitudes of the political elite who used to be pro-EU actors before.

2.2 Determinants of Party Positioning on the EU Accession

It is acknowledged that when determining the EU stances of political parties in Europe, besides economic right/left positioning, a new non-economic GAL (Green, Alternative, Libertarian)- TAN (traditionalism, authority, nationalism) dimension has been used by a group of authors from the North Caroline School (Hooghe et al., 2002, p.35). Accordingly, the TAN parties are the defendants of nationalism, conservatism and traditional cultural values while being indifferent to environmental degradation, opposing multiculturalism and minority rights. At the same time, it is asserted that the GAL parties generally favor equal chances for everyone regardless of religion, ethnicity, gender and race (Marks et al., 2006, p. 157). Additionally, it is in their priority to possess environmental concerns, and to promote rights of minorities and immigrants (ibid).

The party positions on European integration have been studied by scholars and it has been concluded that GAL parties seem to be pro-EU while TAN parties show more euro-skeptic attitudes in all European countries regardless of West or East. However, main difference is found to be in LEFT/RIGHT dimension when comparing Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) with Western Europe. In CEECs, RIGHT/GAL parties are pro-EU and LEFT/TAN parties show more tendency towards euro-skepticism, while there is no such difference in the West European parties (ibid, p. 167). As a main LEFT/TAN phenomenon, communism is believed to have delivered more economic equality than market economies,

however it had actually suppressed public dissent and impeded different lifestyles (ibid, p. 159). In the cases of CEECs, it should be remembered that the Left parties had brought the Communist regime and now they are seen as ‘transition losers’ (ibid, p. 161). They resist the EU-led reforms because they suspect any change in their communal status quo (ibid). GAL, on the other hand, is mainly populated by RIGHT wing parties who have realized the Europeanization of the CEECs, and are categorized as ‘transition winners’. As Western Europe did not experience such a transition and maintained its liberal market economy prospectively towards Europeanization, both from right and left spectrum, the political parties today show GAL tendencies (ibid, p. 159).

However, RIGHT/LEFT and GAL/TAN classification of political parties is only helpful in detecting endogenous factors towards pro-EU tendencies, holding the exogenous factors constant. With respect to this, the EU’s conditionality is not stable and predictable (ibid, p. 160).

Three factors define the success of the EU’s political conditionality throughout the accession process (Schimmelfennig, 2008, p. 921):

(1) Credible membership conditionality: The EU has developed an accession criteria (namely Copenhagen Criteria) which provides the conditions a candidate country should comply with

(2) Normative consistency: There is a normative firmness sought in candidates’ democratic and human rights performance compatible with the EU standards without having any discrimination based on nationality or culture.

(3) Low political costs of domestic compliance: Candidates may find it very costly to comply with the EU conditionality.

1. and 2. factors according to Schimmelfennig, are directly dealt by the EU but the 3. factor is important in the sense that domestic perceptions and calculations would result in non-compliance with the EU conditionality (ibid). It is clear that like North Carolina School, Schimmelfennig too has a focus on endogenous factors to describe failure of domestic compliance as well as euro-skepticism in accession countries.

However, there should be an alternative investigation to evaluate domestic perspectives on the EU conditionality. This would require to assess the issue by looking not only from outside in, but from inside out. For this investigation, rather than concentrating only on domestic factors, one “needs to grasp domestic reactions against the perceived level of EU’s legitimacy

in its conditionality towards accession countries”(Gülmez, 2013, p. 3). From Suchman’s research on legitimacy it can be deduced that Schimmelfennig’s approach takes into consideration the ‘pragmatic legitimacy’ through which the EU is capable of responding to the self-interested calculations of candidate states. However, Suchman (1995) also underlines that the EU has only high level of ‘pragmatic legitimacy’ when it successfully responds to ‘exchange legitimacy’, ‘influence legitimacy’ and ‘dispositional legitimacy’ in its relations with a candidate country (p. 587). The exchange legitimacy is related with domestic expectations of receiving net benefits, the influence legitimacy deals with involvement in EU decision making mechanisms, and the dispositional legitimacy considers being treated fairly by the EU on non-discriminatory grounds (ibid).

In this study, taking the CHP’s EU policy particularly requires such an approach to be not restricted only by endogenous factors but also exogenous factors while explaining its euro-skeptic position. In order to do a fuller analysis of euro-skepticism in Turkey, there should also be an investigation to test if the EU in its relations with Turkey is capable of providing with credible membership prospects (high influence legitimacy) and of maintaining normative consistency (high dispositional legitimacy).

CHAPTER 3

THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (CHP)

3.1 Historical Development

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the Republican People's Party (CHP) in 1923. He was the leader of the Turkish Independence War (Bila, 1999, p. 40). Today CHP is considered as the founding party of Turkish Republic. It is accepted that CHP originates from the Association of the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia whose success cannot be neglected in the War of Independence to coordinate national forces. The 'Six Arrows' of the party symbolizes the principles of the CHP being republicanism, nationalism, statism, populism, secularism and reformism. The CHP remained as the single party of the new Turkish Republic until 1945. Adoption of multi-party system failed in 1923 and 1930. However, it had become necessary to make radical transformations towards multi-party system by the end of the Second World War (Eroğul, 1990, p.113).

In 1945, the multi-party system was officially adopted in Turkey. This is considered as an important step towards establishing a democratic regime. However, it is noteworthy to mention that this transition was controlled by many restrictive laws. İsmet İnönü as the president of the Republic limited any expansionary act that would bring a party in opposition which has a different ideology (Eroğul, 1990, p. 115). Therefore, it can be said that at this period CHP wanted to relieve pressure against single party regime and at the same time tried to control the formation of opposition. However, such an attempt of CHP failed and as opposition the Democrat Party was founded gaining the majority of public support (Bila, 1999, p. 116). The transition to multiparty system caused the Democrat Party (DP) to gather a large amount of public support due to massive reactions to the single party regime. This had caused shift of considerable amount of representatives from CHP to Democrat Party. As a result, to go for a change in major functions of the CHP had become necessary.

After 1950s industry in Turkey began to develop causing formation of the working class on which CHP could rely on (Aktükün, 1999, p. 23). However, reforming of CHP as a social democratic party was difficult since it had a very 'statist' behavior in the past. Thus, it can be said that the CHP's transition to a true social democratic party did not take place and the party could not win general elections in 1950, 1954 and 1957. However, being in the opposition it was reflecting the voices of different segments from the society against despotic rule of the Democrat Party. The CHP's position against the rule of the Democrat Party was a symbol of

continuing democracy in Turkey since it could reflect the rising social complaint against the DP government. (Eroğul, 1990, p. 131). Such an inclination in CHP's political behavior can be counted as a sign of choosing social democracy as party ideology. With respect to this, the CHP with the 'Primary Purposes Declaration' (İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi) aimed to represent its democratic program against the rule of the DP in 1959. Applying this program was not possible because the 1960 military coup shut down all the political parties. Six years after, this attempt was formulated as party's inclination towards 'left of center' (Övür, 2011, p.5). This was also explained by İsmet İnönü himself that this declaration was the source of the 'left of centre' concept they had adopted (Bila, 1999, pp. 214-215). The military coup of 1960 had come along with economic problems, DP's despotic behavior towards opposition and abuse of their power in their interest. As a result of the military intervention, Turkey's Constitution was recreated. However, it had also caused the revival of the working class which in return resulted in rise of Turkish Labor Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) which was founded by trade unionist and for the first time in Turkish history gained 3% of total votes and entered into parliament with fifteen deputies. (Özdemir, 2002, pp. 255-256) This had caused rising concerns in CHP to control the leftist movement, meaning that it wanted to make use of rising leftist movement in advance of itself and to prevent the extremist expansions at the same time (Bila, 1999, pp. 211-212). With respect to this, the CHP officially accepted the 'left of centre' concept as its trajectory in 1965. In terms of gaining a 'social democratic identity', İsmet İnönü considered this an effective attempt but the decision was not collectively taken. (Dağıstanlı, 1998, p. 16). Efforts to transform the party into a social democratic one however, dates back to 1950s when the party recognized set of rights for the working class, such as 'right to strike'. Additionally, election manifesto of CHP in 1954 included statements that promised extensive protections for the working class. (Aktükün, 1999, p. 23). However it is important to note that the concept of 'left of centre' identified by İsmet İnönü was limited within the scope of Kemalism emphasizing the principles of secularism, statism and populism. Bülent Ecevit, the Secretary General of CHP in 1966 had an aim to extent 'social character' of the party by emphasizing the need for developing land reform, right to strike and nationalization of the Turkish petrol (ibid). Ecevit's 'left of centre' approach was developed against the rise extremist left movement, such as communism. They feared that injustice and poverty within the society would lead to an extensive communist movement. Thus, Ecevit took a position within the scope of capitalism to fight against communist movement that was sponsored by the Soviet Union (Aktükün, 1999, p. 24). "After 1971 military coup by memorandum, the CHP left the politics on two main positioning of the political leaders. While the group headed by İsmet İnönü supported the military intervention,

the group of Bülent Ecevit as ‘democratic leftist’ opposed them resulting in a tough opposition within the party (Övür, 2011, p.6). With his ‘democratic leftist’ approach, Ecevit gained popularity among the working class and trade unions, and became the leader of CHP in 1972. CHP, after the single party period for the first time in its history, in 1973 elections came to the power. With the slogans “this order will change” and “soil for the hard working, water for the efficiently user”, it realized a ‘democratic leftist’ rise (ibid). This proves that CHP once again went through a radical change process, however it did not change the six main principles of its Kemalist position. In this context, democratic leftist promises resulted in a respectful increase in the votes it had gained. Ecevit getting the support of Turkish society received 33 percent of the popular vote in 1973, and 41.6 percent in 1977. However, the CHP’s policies were still based on “one nation, one language, one sect” principle thus failing to find solutions to the problems of “Kurdish matter, religious minorities and democratization” (ibid). In these matters, instead of applying social democratic principles such as freedom, equality, solidarity, they insisted on sustaining Kemalist principles. Even though “democratic leftism” as the trajectory of CHP had become official after declaration of it in 1976 party program and universal principles of social democracy namely freedom, equality, solidarity, primacy of labour were added to the principles of the six arrows (Bila, 1999, p. 354), it failed to find a practical solution to the above mentioned problems. It is still noteworthy to mention that CHP was internationally recognized as a social democratic party in 1977 by the Socialist International. (ibid). The CHP was closed in 1981 by military junta together with all other political parties. (Bila, 1999: 356). Once again a transition to democratic regime was restricted by military regime, allowing parties to be reopened in 1983. The period between 1980 and 1995 can be viewed as disintegration of the left and rise of the rule of the centre-right; or in other words the period of depoliticization. A new constitution which restricted individual freedoms, curbed trade union and social demands, and glorified the state was adopted in 1982. “As a consequence, Turkey was ruled until 1998 uninterruptedly by governments led by the centre-right: the ANAP (Motherland Party), which was founded and led by Özal, and the DYP (True Path Party), which was the unofficial successor of the DP-AP line; both were representatives of the right-wing populist tradition” (Cıngı, 2011, p. 3) The disintegration of the left was followed by CHP’s split into three parties: the People’s Party (HP), the Social Democracy Party (SODEP), and the Democratic Left Party (DSP). HP and SODEP went into unification, in 1985, under the name of Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP); but the Democratic Left Party remained apart.

For the recovery of left it can be said that CHP managed to rebuild itself in 1993 and was integrated with SHP in 1995. However, the Turkish centre left politics were represented by both CHP and DSP. In national elections of 1995 CHP gained about 10 per cent of the total votes, being just above the threshold. Following this, the parliamentary elections took place in 1999, 2002 and 2007 under the leadership of Baykal. CHP in 1999 could not enter the parliament receiving the votes below the threshold. In 2002, CHP received 19 per cent, in 2007 20.8 per cent of the popular vote. It is acknowledged that under Baykal's leadership, the CHP employed extra secularist and nationalist policies which caused the party to be perceived as almost an elitist and right wing party (Gülmez, 2013, p.5). Upon a sex tape scandal, Baykal resigned from his position and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu became the leader of the party in 2010. Kılıçdaroğlu made two initial changes within the party. First, he aimed to change the elitist appearance of the party which was strictly emphasizing the protection of secularism against political Islam. Instead, he prioritized formation of a social policy that fights against poverty and corruption. Second, he replaced the party's ruling positions with the former staff that had left the party because of disagreements with Baykal (Gülmez, 2013, p.5).

3.2 Evaluating the CHP's Ideological Shift

The CHP's formation as an establishment party of Turkish Republic, is relied on traditionalism, authority and nationalism (TAN). However, against such a classification as suggested by Keyman and Öniş, one can also question that how a reformist party can be traditionalist at the same time. Since we know that the CHP has played a major role in transforming the traditional Ottoman Empire into democratic Turkish state has been successful to an extent. However, (T) variable of TAN classification rather concentrates on preserving cultural values, demonstrating state centric behavior and possessing high number of bureaucrats in party formation. Therefore, under such dimension the CHP falls into TAN spectrum. Its positioning on the 'left' goes back to 1970s when Bülent Ecevit's stance aimed to "defend those who could not benefit from the welfare system of the society, did not exploit others, could not obtain undue privileges, and could not defend their own interests and rights" (Güneş-Ayata, 2002, p. 103). Although having a leftist position as an economic ideology, according to Keyman and Öniş (2007) the CHP's self-realization as a true European social democratic party (LEFT/GAL) has not taken place since historically it played an authoritarian role in the establishment of the republic and failed to change its position in this regard (p. 214). It is explained that the establishment of the Turkish Republic followed a top-down process in which the CHP was the engine to realize a state centric modernization with a purpose to create an advanced economy with a secular society (ibid). As it was mentioned

before, Ecevit's attempt to promote the centre-left in the 1970s was not successful to turn the party into a true social democratic (LEFT/GAL) one since the state-centrism (TAN) had always been the main feature of the party (Öniş & Grigoriadis, 2010, p. 264)

Just after coming to power in 1973 and 1977, the military junta of 1980 closed the CHP and other political parties. Regarding this Öniş and Grigoriadis (2010) stated that militarily takeover of the government endangered both EU-Turkish relations and the CHP's political standing. This had not only resulted in temporary suspension of Turkey-EU relations but also brought down the party which had retained the public support for the first time (p. 264). "The strategy pursued by the military government to depoliticize the Turkish society affected the centre-left politics negatively and contributed to the considerable decline of the CHP's popularity" (Gülmez, 2013, p. 4)

After the 1980 coup d'état, many criticisms arose towards statist and secularist policies of the CHP (Öniş & Grigoriadis, 2010, p. 264). What is more, labor unions which were important actors of centre-left politics of 1970s became more and more marginalized and less influential after 1980s when the neo-liberal politics have gained strength in Turkey (ibid, p. 267). As a result, united centre-left politics under CHP was divided into two clashing groups by the establishment of Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP) causing a strong rivalry among the social democrats and dividing the left of centre votes.

After being closed for eleven years, Deniz Baykal the former leader of the CHP, re-opened the party in 1992 with a similar leftist attitude. However, since then the CHP could never come to power, maintaining its nationalist rhetoric which strengthened the TAN feature of the party. Accordingly, "the inability of the party to adapt to the demands of masses, the lack of capability to transform party's ideological stance, and the unending leadership struggles coupled with soaring factions within the party following its re-opening even resulted in a failure of the CHP to enter the parliament in 1999 obtaining only eight percent of the total votes" (Gülmez, 2013, p. 4). However, some argue that the CHP was lucky to stay away from the government when economic crisis of 2001 caused the parties in government to lose prestige among the public (Öniş & Grigoriadis, 2010, p. 265).

Following this, in 2002 elections the CHP gathered 19.38 of the popular vote and became the main opposition party in the government. Baykal's main strategy in the elections was based on the discourse of stressing the AKP's Islamic policies against the secular republic. However, this was not helpful to the party to increase its share of votes in the following

elections in 2007 (Ciddi, 2008, p. 5). Although secularism is considered as a feature of GAL dimension (Marks et al., n.d, p. 157), the CHP's stance as being too assertive to create a purely secular public domain and to detain the religion in the private domain made the party's TAN feature more powerful (Kuru, 2009, p. 17). It is provided that “ Baykal was held responsible for the party's ill-performance in elections for so long as he was accused of having detached the party from the masses and polarized the public treating them being either secular or a religious fundamentalist; a republican or a separatist; a Kemalist or a second republican; a patriot or a traitor” (Gülmez, 2013, p. 4). Therefore, the TAN feature of the party was strengthened in the Baykal period causing the party to be dismissed from the list of social democratic parties by Socialist International (ibid).

Under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, the CHP has shifted from TAN to GAL by making changes in its nationalistic and secularist policies regarding controversial issues such as giving cultural rights to the Kurdish people and wearing headscarf in the public places. The CHP under Baykal's leadership often disregarded the minority rights by not recognizing the Kurds as a minority group, but Kılıçdaroğlu supports any expansion of minority rights (ibid). With respect to this, Kılıçdaroğlu went to main Kurdish cities for election campaigns and hired Sezgin Tanrikulu who was one of the lawyers of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of Kurdish terrorist group (PKK), as the deputy leader in the party. “Regarding the headscarf issue, the CHP under Baykal had been adamant in its opposition to the entry of students to universities wearing headscarves deeming it incompatible with Turkey's secularism” (Gülmez, 2013, p. 5) However, Kılıçdaroğlu took a position to make it free to wear headscarves in the universities. Moreover, rather than being stuck on nationalist and republican stances unlike Deniz Baykal he emphasized to give strength to domestic economic problems and corruption. As a response to this change, there were criticisms arising against losing the Republican features. “The 2012 CHP congress witnessed the rise of a faction of Baykal supporters challenging Kılıçdaroğlu; yet this only reinforced his authority and helped him completely wipe out Baykal's traces from the party” (Gülmez, 2013, p. 5). In this congress, the CHP proved to shift its ideology to a more social democratic standing by adopting a new statute which denies Baykal's ‘patriotic left’ stance and brings a more democratic expansion within the party. For instance; “it introduces ten percent youth quota and increases the gender quota from 25 per cent to 33 per cent in the party assembly; enables all party branches to select their own candidates for the general elections and also provides them with more financial support; and finally emphasizes the protection of human rights as one of its core social democratic principles” (Gülmez, 2013,

p. 5) All these changes can be regarded as a transformation in the party's ideological stance from LEFT/TAN to LEFT/GAL, as in other European social democratic parties.

CHAPTER 4

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHP'S EU STANCE

The CHP's EU stance has generally been critical about the EU's position on the problematic issues in human rights, rule of law, and democratization of Turkey in domestic sphere. What is more, relations with the other EU members have been very important in their critical stance to show reactions. Here, some cases have been studied to demonstrate how the opposition party CHP have responded to these issues considering Turkey's and the EU's role in solving the problems. For human rights issues, I take the cases of minorities where CHP seem to have reacted with nationalist reflexes. For the rule of law and democratization, the cases of 2010 Constitutional Referendum and Ergenekon law-suit have been studied. What is more, the CHP official seem to be very critical about the EU for not doing its homework in solving the problems in Cyprus dispute and applying double standards to Turkey as seen in the official documents.

4.1 The CHP's EU Policy under Baykal's Leadership

The CHP under Baykal's leadership was critical about the EU, even though they were considering Turkey's EU membership as part of Atatürk's modernization project. Therefore, they highly emphasized the importance of Ankara Agreement which was signed by İsmet İnönü to realize Turkey's full membership in the EU. It should be also noted that Baykal was the Foreign Affairs Minister of Turkey when the Customs Union was partially adopted between Turkey and the EU. In this process, Baykal had played a crucial role to realize the customs union in early 1990s (Ayata & Güneş-Ayata, 2007, p. 223). However, the CHP's euro-skeptic stance started after the 2002 elections when the party became opposition to the AKP government. The CHP's critical stance regarding the EU-Turkish relations can be depicted with endogenous and exogenous factors. The endogenous factors take the attention from the party with an inclination to preserve Republican reflexes such as assertive secularism and nationalism, while exogenous factors cover the party's reaction to the EU's extra conditionality towards Turkish membership and Turkey-skepticism in main EU countries. (Gülmez, 2013, p. 6)

Endogenous factors are related with the Republican reactions the CHP directed both to the EU and AKP government under Baykal's leadership. Securing national sovereignty and not giving concessions on Republican reflexes such as nationalism and secularism were of

primary importance for the party. Therefore, during Baykal's leadership the CHP generally was critical about EU-led reforms.

In general, the CHP opposed many EU-sponsored reforms at the time of Baykal's leadership as the reforms required a trade-off between liberalization and the Republican values. They had also suspicions that through such liberalization the governing party, AKP would undermine the secularism principle and reinforce religious life style over the Turkish society (Gülmez, 2008, p. 415) The EU-led reforms that did not fall into the scope of CHP's criticism were in the fields such as natural life, protection of animals, food and nutrition standards (ibid). With respect to endogenous factors, the cases of amending Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code and the EU's imposition for minorities concept will be analyzed.

There were also exogenous factors that shape the EU policy of the Baykal's CHP on the EU's extra conditionality and Turkey-skeptics in the European countries. In general, CHP considered the EU's Turkey policy as discriminatory in several cases. With regard to exogenous factors, Cyprus dispute and official accession documents will be analyzed.

4.1.1 Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code

Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code was designed to criminalize those who disparage 'Turkishness'. The EU sponsored the Turkish government to change this law to expand freedom of expression. The CHP's reaction was on the ground that the article only aimed to remind people to respect dignity of Turkish nation, therefore making a freedom by abolishing the word of 'Turkishness' from the law, the EU had caused liberalization of the 'insult' against Turkish nation (Yılmaz, 2011, p. 196). What is more, Baykal claimed that many other Member States already had a similar article in their penal codes, and in their accession process they were not obliged to dismiss the law.

The Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, before the amendment with its strong wording emphasizing the protection of the dignity of the Turkish race, was open to wide interpretation. As the line between 'insult' and 'criticism' was not so clear, the public prosecutors were often suing this article against human rights defenders, journalists and civilians on the ground that they insulted 'Turkishness'. For instance, the famous Turkish writer Orhan Pamuk was judged in the line with this article, since he said in an interview that 30.000 Kurds and 1.000.000 Armenians have been killed by Turks in their nation state building project (Fendoğlu, 2006). What is more, some of writers and thinkers like the Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, up on being prosecuted on the article 301, have been assassinated. (Heinrich Böll Stiftung Derneği,

n.d.). Fendoğlu (2006) also mentioned that such articles are present in the laws of many other European countries but they are not as ambiguous as the old Turkish Penal code, and the public prosecutors did not refer to this article as frequently as they did in Turkey. Therefore, the old form of the article was thought to be restricting the freedom of expression effectively.

The new wording of the article 301, uses ‘Turkish Nation’ instead of ‘Turkishness’ and for any case to be prosecuted on this law first requires the confirmation of the Ministry of Justice. In this scope, it can be said that amendment of the law brought more freedom of expression on the controversial issues, and Baykal’s reaction does not sound righteous.

4.1.2 Minority Rights

4.1.2.1 Kurdish Question

Another issue was about the EU’s conditionality to expand minority rights by giving the Kurdish people minority status as other non-muslim ethnic groups living in Turkey, but on a linguistic and cultural base (Gülmez, 2013, p. 5). However, the CHP’s approach to this issue was very controversial claiming that accepting Kurds as a minority would breach the Lausanne Treaty. Baykal claimed that “Kurds and Turks had been living together, getting married together for centuries; therefore almost everyone from Western Turkey has family ties in the Eastern Anatolia” (Gülmez, 2013, p. 6). He also stated that Kurdish people were not in need of being recognized as a minority group and being treated alternatively, and it was the EU who approached the issue in a separatist position.

From the very beginning of accession talks, we know that the European Commission is very critical about the Kurdish issue, placing it at the core of the entire assessment of compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. According to the first progress report, it is stated that the Kurdish issue requires a civil and not a military solution (European Commission, 1998). What Turkey had adopted in these years as a militarily solving the problem by considering it as a domestic security threat, caused an overall bad performance in human rights and the rule of law in the country. Therefore, this had resulted in non-compliance with the Copenhagen criteria in general (European Commission, 1998). Later on, the Commission’s wording regarding the Kurdish issue became more and more technical and detailed. In these reports, the Kurdish problem has been touched upon from different perspectives, “including the judicial approach pointing to the status of human rights, civil and political rights, economic and social rights and cultural rights as well as minority rights” (Cengiz & Hoffmann, 2012, p. 11).

In the last progress report, however, the European Commission does not seem like insisting on giving the ethnic groups minority status, as it was feared by Baykal. It instead emphasizes the promotion of Turkish citizens' rights regardless of ethnic origin, religion or language: "Apart from the non-Muslim minorities recognized by Turkey under the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish authorities consider Turkish citizens as individuals with equal rights before the law rather than belonging to the majority or a minority. However, this approach, which provides for full equality for all citizens, should not prevent Turkey from granting specific rights to certain citizens, in line with European standards, on the basis of ethnic origin, religion or language, so that they can preserve their identity" (European Commission, 2013).

In this context, as feared by Baykal Turkey has never tried to take an extra action to recognize the Kurds as a minority group, neither has this been dictated by the EU. However, as the Kurdish question has been under red line of the Turkish politics, Turkey has always adopted a limited approach for giving the Kurds cultural rights. "The strongest arguments against the separation of Anatolia relate to the legacies of the Turkish Independence War, and this as a hallmark of Kemalist nationalism" (Toktaş & Aras, 2009, p. 713). That is why, Republican reflexes always stress any kind of expansion in the cultural rights of different ethnic groups on the ground that they might entail to a disintegration of the country. Therefore, they have always restricted such an act by rejection or blockage in domestic politics (ibid). With respect to this, it can be said that while Turkey targeted to meet the Copenhagen criteria for the cultural rights of minorities, it put restrictions to bring further freedoms and rights that might put Turkey into a position where it has to recognize other ethnic groups as official minorities (ibid).

Accordingly, the prime minister's human rights advisory board prepared a report on minorities and minority rights at a press conference in October, 2004. The report clearly pointed out that it would be a mistake to assume that the EU demands Turkey to give various cultural groups minority status but it demands equal conditions applicable to the all citizens regardless of their cultural differences (ibid). Thus, Baykal's CHP proves to be wrong in their approach to the EU's conditionality regarding Kurdish problem.

4.1.2.2 Non-Muslim Minorities

In the year 1974, it was decided by the Turkish Supreme Court that minority group associations after declaring their current properties in 1936, cannot own any additional property. This official decision of Turkish Republic caused to transfer of some of minority

associations properties to the local municipalities and even selling of them to the third parties. In 2007, ECHR found the act of Turkish Supreme Court in 1974 unlawful, and required Turkey to pay compensation to these associations (Çevikalp, 2011) Up on this decision of the ECHR, Armenian and Greek minority associations with a reform on the property rights of minority groups were decided to be given compensation, and the CHP reacted to this reform by claiming that such an issue would be infringement of the article 45 of the Lausanne Treaty: “The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory” With respect to this, the treaty underlines the principle of reciprocity which would make the EU as a third party demand the same reforms from other member states such as Bulgaria and Greece which have Turkish minority groups. However, accordingly it was not the case in their accession to the EU.

Here, the CHP’s concerns are not about giving compensation to the minorities, but the way the EU approaches to the problematic issues of its members and candidate states. The Turkish minority in Greece deserves mention, because it clearly demonstrates why there is a belief in Turkey that they face double standards throughout their accession process with the EU.

In Greece, only one minority is officially recognized under the name of ‘Muslims’, according to the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. In line with this, in Turkey too, only non-Muslim minorities are officially recognized. Throughout the years, the EU has put its weight on the controversial issues regarding these minority rights and it was decided that these issues were to be overcome with respect to fulfilling Copenhagen political criteria. Even though there has been some progress regarding the rights of these minorities in Turkey, the Greek government’s unlawful acts against the Turks living there did not take enough attention from the EU. According to Human Rights Watch, there have been explicit violations of the rights of the Turkish minority who live in Western Thrace. The main reason lying under the Turkish problem is Greek Government’s attitude against Turks seeing it as an external threat which should be minimized or isolated (Human Rights Watch, 1999). In Greece, using the word of ‘Turkish’ to define Turkish minority has been prohibited by the Supreme Court relying on a low court decision to close down ‘the Turkish Union of Xanthi’ for the reason its name comprises the word ‘Turkish’. The justification for this decision to close down the foundation was claimed as it clearly reflected the existence of an ethnic minority, worked for the interest of a foreign country, had an aim to raise a minority problem, and endangered the public order with the use of the word ‘Turkish’ (Amnesty International, 2005).

Greece, by rejecting the minority's Turkish identity, went so far as to put individuals in trial who publicly called the minority with the name 'Turkish' (Human Rights Watch, 1999). With respect to implementation of Lausanne Treaty, the problem is not only about recognizing the minority's identity, but also it covers Greek State's interference into minority's religious life, administration of minority foundations and education (Human Rights Watch, 1999). What is more, Article 19 of the Citizenship Law before its repeal in 1998 provided that citizens who were not originally Greek could have their citizenship revoked if they decide to leave the country without returning back. However, according to an Amnesty International Report, this law had created a non-transparency in its application causing many people to be forced to leave the country without their consent. Until its repeal in 1998, 60.000 people were withdrawn from their Greek citizenship. At a time when the EU is critical about Turkey's attitude towards its non-Muslim citizens, it should also consider minimal levels of consistency of Greece's actions towards its Turkish minority with respect to Lausanne Treaty. Therefore, the CHP's reaction seeking the implementation of the reciprocity principle in the EU's conditionality against Turkish Membership proves to have valid ground.

The CHP's concerns regarding the EU-led reforms, according to Keyman and Öniş (2007, p. 214) reflect its long established state-centric Republican legacy that impeded the party from changing its vision towards democratization. This proves that the CHP's republican assertiveness strengthened its TAN dimension turning it into a 'status quo' party. By such reactions it became a LEFT/TAN euro-skeptic party. "This hardline stance signaled the erosion of the EU's exchange legitimacy over the party, as the party's concerns for losing the republican values overweighed the excitements for membership gains in exchange" (Gülmez, 2013, p. 7).

4.1.3 Cyprus Dispute

There were also exogenous factors that shape the EU policy of the Baykal's CHP on the EU's extra conditionality and Turkey-skeptics in the European countries. In general, CHP considered the EU's Turkey policy as discriminatory in several cases. Baykal asserted that without solving the Cyprus problem, the EU should not have given full access to the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). What is more, he considers the EU's pressure on Turkey to comply with additional protocol to open the airspace and the ports to the Greek Cypriots as a double standard policy, while putting a trade embargo on Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). It was stated in the Party Assembly Report that rather than pressurizing Turkey for official recognition of the whole island under the name of Republic of Cyprus, if the EU

really wants to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, it should push the Republic of Cyprus to come to a compromise between two communities (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 2005d, p. 74)

Baykal stated that Cyprus issue brought the Turkish-EU relations into a blockage impeding Turkey's full accession to the EU. However, he also mentioned that if Turkey does not become a member either by not fulfilling the accession criteria or prevented by the EU, it is not fatally important, because preserving the national interest in Cyprus is of more importance (Hürriyet, 2005). The Vice-Chairman of the CHP of that time, Onur Öymen criticized the EU for not creating equal conditions for the Cyprus problem to be solved. According to him, the EU will always stay behind its member to protect its interest against a non-member country, no matter the non-member is right. Therefore, accordingly in order for the problem to be solved under equal conditions, all parties should have membership status in the EU (Öymen, 2011) The most important point is that with respect to the CHP's claims, it should be analyzed that if the accession of Cyprus into the European Union would constitute an infringement of international law in the absence of Turkey's membership into the EU.

The Cyprus dispute which dates back to 1963 was given a trial for a settlement to be achieved in 2004 with the ratification of the Annan Plan by two communities. It was by far the most in depth studied plan by the UN to find a comprehensive federal solution to the Cyprus dispute, with an aim to reintegrate politically and physically divided island before its formal accession to the EU in May, 2004. Even though the EU supported and advocated the Annan Plan which was based on the principles of bizonality, political equality, the respect for ethnic diversity and human rights, it allowed the accession of physically divided island despite the failure of the referenda in March, 2004 (ICG, 2006, pp. 3-5).

In order to challenge the fairness of EU conditionality towards Turkey and TRNC in the Cyprus dispute, one should look at the period when the EU applied negative conditionality to the one party, while applying positive conditionality to the other. Between the years 1993 and 1999, the EU clearly applied a double conditionality strategy towards Turkey and the GCA (Greek Cypriot Administration) who were seeking to become EU members (Gülmez & Buhari-Gülmez, 2008, p. 7). However, in this period the EU treated differently to the two parties by giving concrete membership prospects to the GCA and threatening Turkey with exclusion from the membership prospects. This attitude of the EU, accordingly sought a change in the intransigent Turkish position regarding the Cyprus dispute, aiming to make Turkey more compromising in finding a solution and to create a direct influence on the TRNC's stance. (Nugent, 1999) Throughout this period, finding a solution to the Cyprus

problem became a pre-condition for Turkey's EU bid, while the GCA was given official candidacy status without such a political precondition.

TRNC had expressed its objections to the legitimacy of the GCA's application to the EU in its Memorandum of 1990. The Commission rejected those objections on the ground that: "(...) these authorities rejected the right of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to speak for the whole of Cyprus in such an approach. They based their position on the Guarantee Treaty and the wording of the 1960 Constitution, which grants the President and Vice-President (a Turkish Cypriot) a veto over any foreign policy decision, particularly any decision on joining an international organization or alliance that does not count both Greece and Turkey among its members. They consider, accordingly, that in the prevailing circumstances the community should not take any action on the application. The community, however, following the logic of its established position, which is consistent with that of the United Nations where the legitimacy of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and non-recognition of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' are concerned, felt that the application was admissible" (European Commission, 1993).

Following this, as TRNC had no legal recognition in the international community, Turkey made an attempt to bring the problem to the EU-Turkey Association Council in 1995. Turkey claimed that GCA under the name of Republic of Cyprus (RoC) should not join "international political and economic unions to which Turkey and Greece are not members" in a joint declaration (MFA, 1995). Turkey also provided a legal opinion prepared by Professor Mendelson in 1997, in support of the TRNC objections to GCA's application to the EU membership.

The Republic of Cyprus's official establishment as an independent state in 1960 accords with the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance. These treaties are also known as the London/ Zurich Accords which were signed by the RoC, Turkey, Greece and UK. The principles brought by these treaties and the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, make Greek and Turkish communities co-founder and co-partner of the republic giving both parties the political and legal equality despite unequal population rates. In line with this, related provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee and 1960 Constitution will be analyzed with respect to RoC's EU accession (Tocci, 2007, p. 58).

4.1.3.1 The Treaty of Guarantee

Accordingly, the GCA is obliged to act in line with the Article I (2) of the Treaty of Guarantee provided that “not to participate in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever” and is prohibited to take part in any activities “to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the island” The arguments dealt with the interpretation of this paragraph asking whether the Treaty outlaws unionization only with another state, or other states. With respect to this, Mendelson (2007) provided that: “(...) as a matter of drafting and the ordinary use of English (and French) language, the singular usually includes the plural and ‘any State (whatsoever)’ is wide enough to encompass ‘any States (whatsoever)’. This interpretation also accords with common sense” Although, the officials who prepared the Treaty had an aim to prevent unionization of the RoC with Turkey and Greece, the Europeanization of RoC has made the country politically, economically and militarily closer to Greece. (Yılmaz, 2010, p. 132).

The other argument on which the EU has based its decision to let RoC in suggests that “ the term ‘State’ in Article I is in the singular. Moreover it is legitimate to take as the context of paragraph 2 the Constitution itself, to which paragraph 1 refers. Article 50 of the Constitution refers to ‘international organizations and pacts of alliance’. Article 169 of the Constitution refers to ‘international agreements with a foreign State or any International Organization relating to commercial matters, economic co-operation... and modus vivendi’. Article I paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee thus proceeds on the basis of a distinction between a ‘political or economic union with any State’, on the one hand, and ‘international organizations and pacts of alliance’, or economic cooperation agreements, on the other hand. It is true that a ‘political or economic union with any State’ could be initiated by a treaty. But what is prohibited by Article I paragraph 2 is union with another state, not cooperation with a group of states in establishing a supranational organization of a political and/or economic character (Crawford et al., 1997) .

However, this cannot disprove the indirect effects of unionization with the EU have improved political and economic ties with the Greece. Therefore, Mendelson’s argument sounds more accurate.

4.1.3.2 The 1960 Constitution

Article 50 (1) (a) of the 1960 Constitution provides that: “The President and the Vice-President of the Republic, separately or conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision of the House of Representatives or any part thereof concerning: (a) foreign

affairs, except the participation of the Republic in international organizations and pacts of alliance in which the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey both participate”. In scope of this article, the accession or application of RoC to the EU falls into the category of ‘foreign affairs’ that the article gives veto power to the Vice President who was supposed to be elected from Turkish Community. However, since 1963-1964 communal clashes when the representation of Turks has ended in the government of RoC, there has been no Vice President elected to perform his duty in legal terms. Instead, with Turkey’s military intervention in the North in 1974, the Turkish Cypriots attempted to build an independent state. Even though, Mendelson (2007) supported the idea that Turks’ right to the veto power should have been respected in any circumstance, non-presence of Turkish Vice President caused even the UN to overlook the applicability of this article on preparations of resolutions. Therefore, Article 50 of the Constitution seems inapplicable to the RoC’s application to the EU (Yılmaz, 2010, p. 132).

What is more, Article 170 (1) of the 1960 Constitution states that: “ The Republic shall, by agreement on appropriate terms, accord most-favored-nation treatment to the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for all agreements whatever their nature may be”.

Based on this article, Mendelson (2007) claimed that the entry of the RoC into the EU would be an infringement of the article in the sense that Europeanization of the RoC would cause a kind of economic unification with Greece and even would make Greece and the UK receive more favorable treatment than Turkey which has not become a member yet.

However, in November 1963 Turkey and RoC signed a Trade Agreement, bringing a limitation to the so called ‘most-favored-nation treatment’ by Article 1: “The above most-favoured-nation treatment shall not apply: (...) I to privileges, exemptions from taxes (fees), preferences or concessions which each of contracting countries has granted or will grant in the future to other countries on account of a present or future participation, entry or association by them to a customs union...” Based on this agreement, it can be concluded that Turkey’s right to receive equal treatment as one of most-favored-nations from RoC was cancelled out and the RoC is not under any obligation to extend all rights which it grants to the EU member states, to Turkey (Yılmaz, 2010, p. 134).

Despite all the opposition and criticism of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey about Greek Cypriots application for EU membership on behalf of the whole island, in June 1993 the European Commission has recommended to consider the application of the Greek Cypriots

appropriate to the EU law. However, it is still questionable to accept that the recommendation of the EU Commission was based on justifiable criteria, since there still seems to be an infringement of Treaty of Guarantee. Even though RoC did not have any constitutional obligation to apply for EU membership, based on Treaty of Guarantee some key elements seem to be overlooked.

Based on my analysis, two arguments can be made on CHP's stance on the EU conditionality of the Cyprus dispute. First, the EU by applying double conditionality strategy on Turkey and RoC between the years 1993-1999 failed to be an effective actor in settlement of Cyprus dispute before its accession to the EU in 2004. In other words, it could have also applied a negative conditionality to the GCA to come to a compromise with the Turkish community living on the island, while making the settlement of Cyprus dispute as a precondition for Turkey's EU membership application. This also contributes to the belief that the EU applies double standards to Turkey's accession process. The second argument would be based on the legality of RoC's application to the EU membership, as the CHP asserted, the EU should not have allowed RoC into the EU on the ground that this would be an infringement of the Treaty of Guarantee.

4.1.4 Official Accession Documents

The EU's extra conditionality for the Turkish membership, according to the CHP officials can also be seen in its official accession documents. "Open-ended accession process envisaged for Turkey is coined as an evidence for the officialization of extra preconditions against Turkish membership"(Gülmez, 2013, p. 7). Baykal criticized the EU for bringing such a precondition which puts Turkey into a position which is short of membership (Hürriyet, 2004). What is more, he also criticized the EU's 'absorption capacity' in the case of Turkey's membership, for prolonging the accession process to an open date (ibid). Moreover, the issue of absorption capacity was not shown as a precondition for the accession processes of eastern enlargement, nor has it been dictated for Croatia's membership, despite the fact that the term has been used to define the EU's integration capacity for the last 20 years, it has become point of emphasis only after Turkey's negotiation process began (Tesev, 2006, p. 6).

Under Baykal's leadership, there were strong objections to the Commission's progress reports which provided the 'permanent safeguard clauses' impeding realization of free movement of persons and receiving the EU funds on the structural and agricultural development (Hürriyet, 2004). Baykal asserted that declaring it as a permanent safeguard clause to impede freedom of movement would mean not to respect founding principles of the

EU when Turkey's membership is the case, therefore this would deny Turkey's full membership permanently (ibid).

The CHP deputies came together in a private session to discuss how to react such expressions in the official documents. In this meeting they also evaluated the Turkey-skeptic stances of some European countries (Gülmez, 2013, p. 8). At the end, they recommended the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan to freeze accession negotiations arguing that such an objection would be a firm warning to the EU officials who were not sure of giving full access to Turkey. However, this did not take place (ibid).

In this period, the CHP also criticized many European officials of being Turkey-skeptic and Erdoğan's presidency to not giving accurate response to them. Especially, Baykal accused Merkel and Sarkozy of being reckless and rude in their co-decision to grant Turkey a privileged partnership (Financial Times, 2009)

The CHP has a categorization of the EU countries according to their stances about Turkey's EU membership. In the first category there are countries like France, Germany and Austria who deny Turkish membership on the ground that Turkey is not European. Under the second category, there are countries like Britain, Spain and Sweden who support Turkey's full accession to the EU. In the last category, there are countries like Greece and Cyprus who normally do not support Turkey's accession but are using the process to solve the bilateral problems in advance of themselves (Öymen, 2005).

Despite the European Council on December 2004 made a decision to start with accession negotiations of Turkey on 3rd October 2005, throughout the year 2005 much effort was spent on preparing accession documents due to raising doubts as to Turkey's credibility (Tesev, 2006, p. 7). It was the Austrian presidency who insisted on that the eventual membership should not have been the full membership until the declaration of the negotiating framework (ibid). Angele Merkel on the other side, informed the heads of Christian Democrats in the European Parliament that Turkey's accession should not have ended up with membership but should have led to 'privileged partnership' and been 'open ended' by nature (ibid). This was also consistent with the France's requirement to make recognition of Cyprus as a precondition so as to start with accession negotiations before 3rd October (ibid). Up on receiving support from main European countries, the Christian Democrat group too in the EP reacted to the opening of negotiations stating that both Turkey and the EU were not ready for negotiating. All these reactions clearly affected the wording in the negotiating framework of Turkey. Although the accession negotiations with Turkey were opened on the same day as Croatia,

one can clearly see the difference of the wording in documents that reflect kind of double standard policy of the EU towards its candidates (ibid, p. 8).

Even though both negotiating frameworks contain the wording that “by their very nature, the negotiations are an open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand”(European Commission, 2005a & 2005b), in Turkey’s document there is the following section: “while having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond” (European Commission, 2005a). This can be interpreted as, if Turkey is not in a position to fulfill the membership requirements under which the ‘absorption capacity’ of the union is also considered as a part of Copenhagen criteria, ‘privileged partnership’ can also be considered for Turkey’s membership prospects. The ‘absorption capacity’ is only mentioned in the negotiating framework of Croatia as to define “an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and Croatia” (European Commission, 2005b), whereas in Turkey’s document it makes the Commission responsible to “monitor this capacity during negotiations, encompassing the whole range of issues set out in its October 2004 paper on issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective in order to inform an assessment by the Council as to whether this condition of membership has been met”(European Commission, 2005a). One can clearly see that no such a measure is introduced for the case of Croatia.

Moreover, there are some statements which also seem discriminatory highlighting the way of transitional arrangements throughout accession talks for two candidate countries. For instance, in the document of Croatia it is stated that “transitional measures and specific arrangements, in particular safeguard clauses, may also be agreed in the interest of the Union” (European Commission, 2005b), while in the document of Turkey the Commission puts forward some objectionable points: “Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its proposals in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture. Furthermore, the decision-taking process regarding the eventual establishment of freedom of movement of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual Member States. Transitional arrangements or safeguards should be reviewed regarding their impact on competition or the functioning of the internal market” (European Commission, 2005a).

By having expressed such provisions in the official documents, the EU has caused loss of trustfulness in the eyes of political and legal actors in Turkey questioning the EU law and its political principles that make the all applicant countries equal before the EU law (Tesev, 2006, p. 7). This can be interpreted as that the EU confronts its basic values and principles on which it is founded. That has actually become a profound EU doctrine throughout its previous enlargements that the EU does not allow for permanent derogations with exclusive provisions in the accession negotiations of new member states. However, in the case of Turkey, there seem to be violations of EU law which make Turkey consider itself as applying for a ‘second class’ EU membership (Tesev, 2006, p. 7).

In line with the comparison done above, the CHP officials seem to have valid ground to give their objections to the discriminatory official documents. However, the reasoning of the EU behind developing such a strategy against Turkish membership needs more discussion.

The ‘Absorption Capacity’ Debate

As mentioned above, the EU has only made it a precondition for Turkey to bring an ‘absorption capacity’ debate into accession talks. The term ‘absorption capacity’ has, however, been developed in 1993 Copenhagen Criteria to define that the EU’s capacity to accept new members should be in the general interests of both parties (Tesev, 2006, p. 8). Despite coined as a term, it has never been a measure in previous enlargements. In other words, in those enlargements after transitional arrangements have been made between the candidates and the EU, it was a task for the EU to deal with before the accession of the candidate countries (ibid). “The concept of ‘absorption capacity’ resurfaced during 2005 in the debate on Turkey’s accession and in the rejection of the proposed Constitutional Treaty by voters in France and The Netherlands, which the political elite in both countries saw as a measure of popular dissatisfaction with the functioning of the European project” (ibid).

In the ‘absorption capacity’ debate, Turkey’s demographics and cultural differences were under the focus. Several observers and critics expressed that for the EU it would be rather problematic to incorporate with a country like Turkey, then it was decided to add terms like ‘absorption capacity’, ‘permanent safeguards’, ‘alternatives to membership’ into the accession criteria with which Turkey has to deal with (ibid).

This was not only a decision of the EU to put forward such conditions, France as a founder state of the EU has prioritized the ‘absorption capacity’ problem up on the start of Turkey’s accession negotiations. French presidency went so far to make a public referendum to decide on future enlargements with bringing a constitutional amendment. (ibid, p. 9) The French

President Chirac, claimed that under the concept of ‘absorption capacity’ of the EU there are institutional, financial, and political reasons and it was the political rights of the EU citizens to express their views in a referendum regarding an enlargement. By the way, because of the wording of the new French law, Croatia’s accession did not fall into referendum criteria (ibid). The right wing parties in France even claimed that failure of the constitutional referendum was due to further enlargement to the east, particularly to Turkey (ibid).

In Germany too, in Federal Government’s Coalition Agreements it is expressed that the EU should be careful about its enlargement policy and take into consideration the importance of ‘absorption capacity’ with respect to its relations with Turkey whose economic, demographic and cultural standing poses a challenge for the Union. It is rather recommended that to consider a ‘privileged partnership’ with Turkey would be a better option (ibid, p.9).

In general from the perspectives of the EU officials or the Member States’ officials, the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’ has societal, institutional and financial dimensions. If we consider the societal dimension, according to a 2006 barometer 48 per cent of the EU citizens are against Turkey’s accession while 39 percent are in favor of it (European Commission, 2006, p. 69). However, it is often not taken into consideration that public support for some countries have fluctuated throughout the years. For example, in 1997 when the enlargement processes of the 12 CEECs were officially started, the figures showed that the public support for Slovakia and Bulgaria was around 36 per cent and that for Slovenia was 33 per cent (European Commission, 1998, p. 55). Even in the year 2002, when the negotiations with the 10 Eastern European countries were finished, public support levels were still around 40 percent which did not entail to stalemate of their full accessions in year 2004 (European Commission, 2003, p. 87).

In the institutional dimension, it is often believed that Turkey’s engagement in the EU institutions, because of its large size, will cause a disruption of institutional balances within the EU. However, there are studies suggesting that Turkey’s accession into the Union would not change institutional balances as expected. It is provided in such a big foundation where there are 28 member states, Turkey will have limited power to initiate or block any decision (Tesev, 2006, p. 12). Instead Turkey, although having almost the same size as Germany would become an important ally for large and small country groups. However, it should also be remembered that Nice Protocol has already brought some limitations to future number of the EU Commissioners and Member of the EP (ibid).

“It would most likely join existing coalitions on given issues and hence do little more than reinforce existing trends in EU politics, such as growing conflict over the budget and increasing cooperation outside of the first pillar” (Tesev, 2006, p. 13). Accordingly, the new member states of the Eastern enlargement have also engaged in the way of consensus-building, and the number of countries who oppose a Council proposal has not yet exceed the usual number of one or two countries (ibid).

The last dimension would be about the concerns on the EU’s ‘financial absorption’ capacity in the case of Turkish enlargement. Today, if we compare the GDP per person levels of Turkey with Romania and Bulgaria, we see that they are almost the same, Turkey having slightly higher levels. This, however does not change the reality that Turkey still is a poor country with large agricultural sector as well as having regional imbalances that will have to be dealt with during the accession negotiations. Studies however show that “as in the case of the last enlargement, the cost to the EU budget – estimated at a maximum of around 0.20 percent of the EU’s GDP - will be manageable. Comparative approaches also suggest that Turkey’s economic position is not any fundamentally different than the economic situations of Poland, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria at the beginning of their accession process” (Tesev, 2006, p. 13).

After having discussed roughly the ‘absorption capacity’ debate, it does not really sound like having either strong theoretical or practical ground. Instead, such an argument creates an impression that this term is being used to create allegedly ‘objective’ barriers to Turkey’s Europeanization.

The CHP under Baykal’s leadership with its critical stance towards the EU’s extra conditionality and Turkey-skepticism in some European countries challenges the idea that the EU is normatively consistent and fair in its enlargement policy.

4.2 The CHP’s EU Policy under Kılıçdaroğlu’s Leadership

After Kılıçdaroğlu became the party leader, he held several meetings with the European ambassadors and statesmen. In general, the attitudes were positive about the CHP’s new leader (Radikal, 2010). In line with the new developments in the CHP, Rasmussen, the leader of the Party of European Socialists, stated that he appreciated Kılıçdaroğlu’s rise to the leadership which would contribute to the construction of fair and strong Europe (Milliyet, 2010). Moreover, Schulz, the leader of the European Parliament Socialist Group stated that he is optimistic about seeing Turkey as a member state in the EU under Kılıçdaroğlu’s

premiership (ibid). However, to what extent the CHP's EU policy has changed after the Baykal's leadership is still questionable. Even though Kılıçdaroğlu has declared that the CHP's EU stance was not transparent to the Europeans, it seems like the party is still rigorous about the problematic issues that arise from endogenous and exogenous factors.

4.2.1 2010 Constitutional Referendum

Endogenous factors cover the reaction of the party towards the AKP's increasing authoritarianism under EU-sponsored reforms. Even though Kılıçdaroğlu approached to the European leaders with more enthusiasm, he reacted to the EU-led reforms negatively. In 2010, a constitutional referendum took place in Turkey for 30 constitutional amendments which were also important with respect to the EU membership (Gülmez, 2013, p. 9). However, the CHP started a NO campaign on the ground that changing three of them would jeopardize the rule of law in Turkey, and increase AKP's authority in the justice system. Therefore, Kılıçdaroğlu blamed the EU statesmen for staying behind these amendments without paying attention to further effects that would make the AKP more authoritarian in domestic politics and judicial system and not improve rule of law in general (ibid). He even claimed that a rapporteur from the EP had been bribed by AKP government so that they could communicate with the EU in the way they wish to show their attempts (ibid).

The constitutional amendments covered an extensive and far-reaching array of issues. We can categorize these issues mainly under two groups. In the first category, which was mainly opposed by the CHP, there are the most controversial issues regarding the composition of and appointment to the top judicial institutions. The amendment brought changes to the organization and election procedure of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges (SBPJ), which was responsible for the appointment of judges and prosecutors across Turkey (Ciddi, 2011). In the second category, there were proposed amendments on articles which were dealing with democratization measures, namely the rights of workers, gender equality and children rights, taking away some special privileges of the military in civil life, and making it rather difficult to shut down political parties in legal terms (Ciddi, 2011).

If the amendments were to be ratified one by one in the referendum, there would be more chance for political consent, thus the debate over referendum would have been more integrative and less criticized. The most debated factor by so far has been the fact that the reforms would alter appointments to and the composition of Turkey's highest judicial bodies in the interest of governing party, the AKP. "Under the new provisions, the president is

entitled to appoint 14 out of the 17 members of the court under the following terms: three from the High Court of Appeals, one from the Military High Court, three academics, five from the legal profession, and two ordinary citizens who are university graduates” (Ciddi, 2011). This may not seem problematic but the appointments to and the composition of Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (SBPJ) might cause problems, because it is the only independent body who deals with the appointment of judges and prosecutors countrywide. Accordingly, the new amendments in this case rendered political influence in the judiciary possible given that what if the ‘natural members’ of SBPJ (according to the new provisions), namely the minister of justice and the permanent secretary as representatives of the government, were to appoint only government friendly judges and prosecutors (ibid). This is also followed by the fact that the president can too appoint members to the Constitutional Court, whom he thinks are close to government ideology (ibid). It is also claimed that this would cause elimination of all foreseeable barriers for the government’s legislative and political prospects. “Critics of the judicial amendments have stated that the AKP is imposing total hegemony over not only the political, but also the judicial system” (ibid). However, this is the worst-case scenario, representing recent state of affairs when Abdullah Gul from the AKP is the president. No one can guarantee that in the future another AKP supporter will be elected as president by the popular vote. “Furthermore, the ability of political parties and/or private citizens to petition the Constitutional Court will continue to allow legislative initiatives to be referred to the Constitutional Court for annulment” (Ciddi, 2011).

There were no complaints about the non-judicial amendments. The EU, as an external actor welcomed the amendments, and made an overall evaluation stating that the measures were significant and extensive reforms since the end of 2004, when the AKP passed a whole series of EU harmonization laws (ibid). However, the CHP’s claim regarding judicial provisions has profound reasoning and even though it welcomed democratization measures, could not convince the EU to see the threat behind judicial provisions

4.2.2 Ergenekon Lawsuit

The Ergenekon group is considered as an terrorist group whose aim was to attempt a coup d’etat to end AKP’s rule in Turkey. With such a claim, thousands of military officials, journalists, politicians and academics have been arrested, even though public opinion is divided over existence of such a terrorist group. Taking the Baykal’s flag, Kılıçdaroğlu too was concerned about the legality of Ergenekon lawsuit and claimed that it was purely political (Gülmez, 2013, p. 10). There are also two CHP deputies who were detainees of the Ergenekon

trials: the journalist Mustafa Balbay and the eminent surgeon Prof. Mehmet Haberal. The CHP did not refrain to show these detainees as candidate for their parliamentary group in 2011 elections with a claim that Ergenekon lawsuit was initiated to persecute the opposition.

Today, it has been proven that the AKP has used these trials to persecute the opposition. The public prosecutors and judges who realized this persecution are now blamed for forming a 'parallel structure' under the government and most important military persons such as İlker Başbuğ who was sentenced to life long imprisonment once have been released. As a result, PM Erdoğan now seems to have played double strategy within its own party and against opposition (Erimtan, 2014).

It seems rather questionable to dismiss CHP's reaction to the Ergenekon trials as an illegal interference with the rule of law as a core EU norm, because the EU seems to be undecided on giving full support to the trials. However, in 2010 progress report it stated that it considers the trials as "...an opportunity for Turkey to strengthen confidence in the proper functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law" (European Commission, 2010, p. 7). All in all, in the same progress report it is expressed that the EU does not deal with neither confirming nor denying existence of such a terrorist group but is concerned with the fact that the high number of journalist and academics under arrest would cause self-censorship (ibid, p. 20) What is more, it finds the "lapse between arrests and the presentation of indictments to the court" rather long and worrying (ibid, p. 7) In the same way, the European Parliament showed its hesitation by urging AKP government to "not to allow legal proceedings to be used as a pretext to exert undue pressure on critical journalists, academics or opposition politicians" (European Parliament, 2010, p. 4).

Regarding the EU led reforms, it can be said that Kılıçdaroğlu continued with Baykal's hardline stance even though he had not approached to the above mentioned issues with republican reflexes. In many cases, especially in drafting of new constitution he based his recommendations on universal principles rather than republican principles (Hürriyet, 2010).

Overall, it can be argued that Kılıçdaroğlu's political standing does not involve preoccupation to preserve republican principles but a critical approach that some of reforms that AKP government has introduced would undermine the rule of law and democracy in Turkey and harm EU the membership prospects of the country (The Washington Post, 2012). He also claimed that AKP seemingly showing itself as an pro-EU party abuses the EU membership process in its advance to empower its authority rather than strengthening democracy and rule of law (CNN Turk, 2011).

Kılıçdaroğlu finds the current speed of the negotiations very slow and accuses the AKP government of being reluctant to the accession negotiations. “Correspondingly, the new CHP claims to be the only Turkish political party that sincerely supports Turkey’s EU accession and promises to finish the accession negotiations in line with the *acquis communautaire* establishing a fully functioning liberal democracy” (Gülmez, 2013, p. 10) However, the CHP criticized the EU for approaching the amendments with a *bon pour l’orient* mentality without caring about the potential dangers those amendments might bring against the Turkish democracy (ibid).

4.3 Under Kılıçdaroğlu’s Leadership Exogenous Factors

Regarding the endogenous factors taking the CHP’s reaction to the AKP’s increasing authoritarianism, as mentioned above, the new CHP has shown a GAL tendency in its political standing. However, the CHP’s overall political standing under the new leader has remained unchanged against the EU’s extra conditionality and Turkey-skepticism in the EU, because of the persisting perception of being treated unfairly. Kılıçdaroğlu in the same way as Baykal, is against the EU’s attitude making the Cyprus dispute as precondition for Turkey’s EU membership process, while approaching to the RoC with a positive attitude. It is also stated in its 2011 election manifesto that it will not accept such an unfair conditionality (CHP, 2011, p. 124)

The Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP preserves its attitude towards the EU’s wording in the official documents. In this sense, it accepts fair membership negotiations without any double standard on an equal footing with the rest of the members. In the election manifesto, it is expressed that it will convince the EU for elimination of any safeguard clause against Turkey (ibid). What is more, it is also expressed that they will work for the most appropriate conditions to be applied to Turkey’s accession process without any double standards (ibid).

With respect to the increasing number of Turkey-skeptic politicians in the EU, Kılıçdaroğlu accuses the EU of not deciding on Turkey’s accession fate by creating a unified and competent approach (Turkish Policy Quarterly, 2010). Nonetheless, he does not see the EU as a reluctant organization, but asserts that it has been mistaken in some cases. What is more, he seems optimistic about future relations and suggests both parties to be not stuck into the mistakes done in the past (ibid).

Having a similar approach to the Baykal’s CHP, the new CHP too blames the European conservatives and the AKP government for the stagnation in the current relations. However,

the CHP under Kılıçdaroğlu, seems rather more optimistic about getting more support from the European social democrats for membership as a result of establishing closer ties with them. In the party manifesto, it is also mentioned that these closer ties would result in a change in the Turkey-skeptic attitudes of the European public (CHP, 2011, p. 123). Therefore, it can be said that the new CHP's attitude towards the EU's extra conditionality and Turkey-skeptics has remained intact while developing a more positive rhetoric

CONCLUSION

In this work, it is argued that the Republican People's Party (CHP) has generally pursued a LEFT/TAN policy which employed the republican reflexes to protect national interest in the relations with the EU. This has not only prevented the CHP from attaining a true European social democratic standing, but also has rendered the party euro-skeptic, as shown in the text, in some important cases. The CHP's EU stance has been analyzed under two dimensions. The analysis of the endogenous factors such as national cost-benefit calculations on the EU-led reforms, has shown that the CHP's reactions to major EU led reforms have concrete ground except the cases for amending Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, and giving the Kurdish people cultural rights. Under the dimension of exogenous factors, all of the party's concerns proved to be true in line with their legal and procedural assessment. This has also made it evident that euro-skepticism besides national cost-benefit calculus, can be related with the EU's extra conditionality and political leaders' inconsistent attitude towards the Turkey's accession process.

The CHP under both leaders has made a cost-benefit calculation of the EU led reforms aiming to increase the democratization process in Turkey. Even though the Kılıçdaroğlu's CHP has a tendency to dismiss its previous TAN rhetoric, which preserved Republican reflexes and legacies, it still persisted its hardline stance towards EU sponsored reforms. However, it has justifiable ground for this. It has been concluded that removing the word 'Turkishness' and replacing it with 'Turkish nation' would qualify the freedom of expression in Turkey. Besides that, the CHP's concerns sound unjustifiable regarding the EU's imposition to give Kurds some cultural rights so that they can preserve their ethnic identity. In this case, the CHP seems rather worried about officially recognizing the Kurds as another minority. However, the party seems righteous for seeking reciprocity principle in EU impositions for non-muslim minorities in Turkey and the Turkish minority in Greece. In this case the EU as a guarantor of universal human rights among its citizens does not treat Greece and Turkey equally, when we take the minorities cases in these countries. With this regard, seeking the reciprocity principle in minority human rights issues what the CHP officials have expressed sound reasonable because there have been many cases where the EU sought ways to pressurize Turkey without pressurizing itself and its member states at the same extent.

What is more, it has also been proven that the 2010 Constitutional referendum under the EU's umbrella, made the governing party AKP take hold of judiciary system in Turkey. The

Ergenekon trials too once again prove the AKP's increasing authoritarianism while the EU refrains from confirming the existence of such a terrorist group.

In their reactions to the exogenous factors, the CHP officials seem to be very well advised. In the case of Cyprus, it has been proven that based on legal documents accession of physically and politically divided island to the EU has breached the Treaty of Guarantee which establishes RoC under protection of its guarantors. What is more, making the settlement of Cyprus dispute a precondition for Turkey's EU membership increases the believes about the EU's double standard policy in its relations with Turkey. Regarding the official documents, it has been concluded that Croatia's accession documents and Turkey's accession document have much important differences. These differences do not only make Turkey apply for a second class membership, but also hampers the EU's consistency with its enlargement policy. Therefore, by giving their reactions to the EU's Turkey policy and Turkey-skeptics in main European countries, the CHP sounds righteous to hold criticism.

Based on the assessment covering the CHP's EU stance over endogenous and exogenous factors, first the EU's exchange legitimacy decreased because there are higher political costs of domestic compliance with the EU led reforms perceived. Second, the dispositional legitimacy of the EU fell down because of not receiving non-discriminatory and rightful treatment from the EU. What is more, one could observe a decrease in its influence legitimacy since the EU's inconsistencies with itself and Turkey-skeptics caused an ambiguity in the membership prospects of Turkey. All these have caused levels of EU's pragmatic legitimacy diminish over the CHP cadre.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Amnesty International (2005) “Greece-Out of the Spotlight: The Right of Foreigners and Minorities still in a Grey Area”, accessed on 10 January 2014, available from: www.amnesty-eu.org
- Aktükün, İ. (1999) “Türkiye’de Sosyal Demokrasi”, İktisat Dergisi, No: 392-393, 19- 26
- Ayata, S. & Günes-Ayata, A. (2007) “The Center-Left Parties in Turkey”, Turkish Studies 8: 211-32.
- Bache, I., George, S. & Bulmer, S. (2011) “Politics in the European Union”, III. Ed., Newyork: Oxford University Press
- Bila, H. (1999) “CHP 1919-1999”, II. Ed., İstanbul: Doğan Kitap
- Borchardt, K. D. (2010) “The ABC of the European Union Law”, Brussels
- Bozkurt, V. (2001) “Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye”, İstanbul: Vipaş
- Canbolat, M. (2002) “Avrupa: Birlige Bir Adım”, Ankara: DSP
- Cengiz, F. & Hoffman, L. (2012) “Rethinking Conditionality: Turkey’s EU Accession and the Kurdish Question”, Tilburg University
- Ciddi, S. (2008) “The Republican People’s Party and the 2007 General Elections: Politics of Perpetual Decline”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3
- Ciddi, S. (2011) “Turkey’s September, 12, 2010 Referendum” accessed on 12 January 2014, available from: <http://www.gloria-center.org/2011/12/turkey%E2%80%99s-september-12-2010-referendum/>
- Cıngı, A. (2011) “CHP: A Party on the Road to Social Democracy”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
- Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (2008)
- Coşkun, E. (2001) “Bütünleşme Sürecinde Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye”, İstanbul: Cem
- CHP (2005) “31. Olağan Kurultayı Parti Meclisi Çalışma Raporu”, accessed on 02 January 2014, available from: <http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/31kurultaycalisma.pdf>
- CHP (2011) “Seçim Bildirgesi”, accessed on 02 January 2014, available from: http://www.chp.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/Se%C3%A7im_Bildirgesi-.pdf
- CNN Türk (2011) “Kılıçdaroğlu: AK Parti, AB’yi Kullandı” accessed on 10 January 2014, available from: <http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/12/11/kilicdaroglu.ak.parti.abyi.kullandi/640081.0/>
- Çakmak, H. (2005) “Avrupa Birliği Türkiye İlişkileri”, Ankara: Platin

- Çevikalp, M. (2011) “Reformlar Türkiye’nin Avrupa’daki imajını düzeltiyor”, accessed on 10 December 2013, available from: <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-30520-176-reformlar-turkiyenin-avrupadaki-imajini-duzeltiyor.html>
- Çulhaoğlu, M. (2002) “Modernleşme, Batılılaşma ve Türk Solu”, in T. Bora and M.Gültekinil (eds.), *Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, İstanbul: İletişim
- Dağistanlı, F. (1998) “Sosyal Demokratlar”, Ankara: Bilgi
- De Vreese, C. H., Boomgaarden, H. G., & Semetko, H. A. (2008) “Hard and soft: Public support for Turkish membership in the EU”, *European Union Politics*, 9:4, 511-30.
- Eroğul, C. (1990) “Çok Partili Düzenin Kuruluşu: 1945-1971”, in İ.C. Schick and E.A. Tonak (eds), *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, İstanbul: Belge
- European Commission (1993) “The challenge of enlargement: Commission opinion on the application by the Republic of Cyprus for membership”, COM(93) 313 final
- European Commission (1998) “Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”
- European Commission (1998) “Standard Eurobarometer 48”, accessed on 2 January 2014 , available from : http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb48/eb48_en.pdf
- European Commission (2003) “Standard Eurobarometer 58”, accessed on 2 January 2014 , available from : http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb58/eb58_en.pdf
- European Commission (2005a) “Negotiating Framework: Turkey”, accessed on 20 December 2013, available from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf
- European Commission (2005b) “Negotiating Framework: Croatia”, accessed on 20 December 2013, available from: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/st20004_05_hr_framedoc_en.pdf
- European Commission (2006) “Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement”, Special Eurobarometer, accessed on 02 January 2014, available from: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_255_en.pdf
- European Commission (2010) “Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”
- European Commission (2013) “Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”
- European Parliament (2010) “European Parliament’s Resoution on Turkey's Progress Report 2009”, B7-0068/2010
- European Union (2005), “Turkey’s Pre-Accession Strategy”, accessed on 10 December 2013, available from: <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e40113.htm>

- European Union (2006) “Partnership for the Accession of Turkey”, accessed on 10 December 2013, available from: <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e40111.htm>
- Financial Times (2009) “Berlin and Paris Univer over Turkey”, accessed on 10 December 2013, available from: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db1f7920-3dc1-11de-a85e-00144feabdc0.html>
- Fendođlu, H. T. (2006) “Türk Ceza Kanunu’nun 301. Maddesinin Analizi ve Deđişiklik Teklifi”, Ankara Barosu
- Gülmez, S. B. (2008) “The EU Policy of the Republican People’s Party: An Inquiry on the Opposition Party and Euro-Skepticism in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No: 3
- Gülmez, S. B. & Buhari Gülmez D. (2008) “The EU Conditionality in the Cyprus Problem: Catalyzing Euro-Scepticism in Turkey?”, Royal Holloway University of London
- Gülmez, S. B. (2011) “Explaining the “change” in the attitudes of Turkish political actors towards EU membership”, Royal Holloway University of London
- Gülmez, S. B. (2013) “The EU Policy of the Republican People’s Party Under Kemal Kılıçdarođlu: A New Wine in an Old Wine Cellar”, Royal Holloway University of London
- Gümrükçü, H. (n.d.) “Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliđi: İlişkinin Unutulan Yönleri, Dünü ve Bugünü”, Ata Entitüsü, Hamburg
- Güneş Ayata, A. (2002) “The Republican People’s Party”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1
- Heinrich Böll Stiftung Derneđi (n.d) “301. Maddenin Deđişikliđi ile İfade Özgürlüğüne Yaklaşıldı mı?”, İstanbul
- Human Rights Watch (1999) “Report on the Turks of Western Thrace: Continuing Violations”, accessed on 10 January 2014, available from: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece;/Greec991-06htm>
- Hürriyet (2004) “Bu Müzakerelerden Tam Üyelik Çıkmaz”, accessed on 7 January 2014, available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=263349>
- Hürriyet (2005) “Baykal: Ek Protokol İmzalanmamalı”, accessed on 12 January 2014, available from: <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=337956>
- Hürriyet (2010) “Bugün İçin Laiklik Tehlikede Diyemem” accessed on 12 January 2014, available from: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/15837090.asp>
- Keyman, F. E. & Öniş, Z. (2007) “Globalization and Social Democracy in the European Periphery: Paradoxes of Turkish Experience”, *Globalizations*, Vol. 4
- Koçak, C. (2002) “Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950)”, in S. Aksin (ed.) *Türkiye Tarihi*, Vol.4, Çağdas Türkiye 1908-1980, 7th Ed., İstanbul: Cem

- Kopecky, P. & Mudde C. (2002) “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe”, *European Union Politics*, 3:3, 297-326.
- Kuru, A. (2009) “Secularism and State Policies towards Religion: The United States, France and Turkey”, New York: Cambridge University Press
- International Crisis Group (ICG) (2006) “The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?”, Policy Report
- Uslu, E. (2008) “Ulusalçılık: the neo-nationalist resurgence in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 73–97.
- Taggart, P. & Szczerbiak, A. (2004) “Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 43:1, 1–27.
- Taggart, P. and A. Szczerbiak (2002) ‘The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Memberand Candidate States’, SEI Working Paper No 51.
- Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne (1923)
- Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Wilson, C. J. (2002) “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 35, No:8
- Marks, G., Hooghe, L., Nelson, M., & Edwards, E. (2006) “ Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 39, No:2
- Mendelson, M. H. (2007) “The Application of the Republic of Cyprus to Join the EU,” in “The Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878-2007, pp. 571-588
- Milliyet (2010) “CHP’ye Avrupa Desteği”, accessed on 02 January 2014, available from: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1276698&Date=23.03.2011&Kategori=siyaset&b=CHPye%20Avrupa%20destegi>
- MFA (1995) “Joint Declaration of the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”
- Radikal (2010) “AB Büyük Elçileri: Kılıçdaroğlu Çok Farklı”, accessed on 02 January 2014, available from: http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/murat_yetkin/ab_buyukelcileri_kilicdaroglu_cok_farkli-1004496
- Öniş, Z. & Grigoriadis I. N. (2010) “Europe and the Impasse of the Centre Left Politics in Turkey: Lessons from the Greek Experience”, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 12
- Övür, M. (2011) “12 Eylül’den 12 Haziran’a Siyasi Partiler: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)”, *Seta Analiz*

- Öymen, O. (2005) “Öymen’s Speech at Bilkent University”, accessed on 2 January 2014, available from: <http://www.onuroymen.com/arsiv/453>
- Öymen, O. (2011) “Turkey-EU Relations, Problems and Prospects”, accessed on 2 January 2014, available from: <http://www.onuroymen.com/arsiv/2834>
- Özdemir, H. (2002) “Siyasal Tarih (1960-1980)”, in S. Aksin (ed.) Türkiye Tarihi, Vol.4, Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980, 7th Ed., İstanbul: Cem
- Samur, H. (2008) “Değişen ve Polülerleşen Bir Kavram Olarak Avrupalılaşıma”, Ç.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Cilt 17, No: 2
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2008) “EU Political Accession Conditionality After the 2004 Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 15, No. 6
- Suchman, M. C. (1995) “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, No. 3
- TESEV (2006) “Seeking Kant in the EU’s Relations with Turkey”, İstanbul
- The Washington Post (2011) “Opposition Being Silenced in Turkey”, accessed on 12 January 2014, available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/opposition-being-silenced-in-turkey/2012/01/26/gIQA0uLfsQ_story.html
- Turkish Policy Quarterly (2010) “Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu Röportajı”, accessed on 2 January 2014, available from: <http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/Kemal%20K%C4%B1%C4%B1cdaroglu%20TPQ%20interview.pdf>
- Tocci N. (2007), “The EU’s Role in Conflict Resolution, Routledge”, pp. 58-63
- Toktaş, S. & Aras, B. (2009) “The EU and Minority Rights in Turkey”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 124, No: 4, New York
- Yılmaz, K. (2010) “A Partitioned State That Is in the European Union: The Case of Cyprus”, Ankara Barosu
- Yılmaz, H. (2011) “Euroskepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites and Public Opinion”, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 16, No.1

CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Information

First Name / Surname: İbrahim USTA

Date of Birth and Place: 20.03.1986 - İstanbul

Education and Training

Name of the High School: Kasımoğlu Koleji, İstanbul, 2004

Undergraduate Education: İstanbul Technical University & State University of New York,
Faculty of Business Administration, Business Administration, İstanbul, 2008

Graduate Education: Akdeniz & Hamburg Universities, European Studies, 2014

Master's Thesis: Akdeniz University & University of Hamburg

Title of the Master's Thesis: Critical Analysis Of The Republican People Party's EU Policy
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi AB Politikasının Eleştirel Analizi

Foreign Languages: English

Work Experience

Marketing Assistant, BBS, Istanbul, Turkey (02-05.2013-Present)

E-Mail: ibrahimusta@live.com

DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and have been generated by me as the result of my original research.

None of the part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree of any other qualification at this University or any other institution

The written Document matches completely to the CD version.

Where I have quoted tom the wort of others, the source is always given within the reference part of my thesis.

Place

Date

Signature